Factor Taxation, Income Distribution and Capital Market Integration
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Capital Income Taxation∗
In an economy with identical infinitely-lived households that obtain utility from leisure as well as consumption, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) have shown that the optimal tax system to pay for an exogenous stream of government purchases involves a zero tax rate on capital in the long run, with tax revenue collected by a distortionary tax on labor income. Extending the results of Hall and Jorg...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Scandinavian Journal of Economics
سال: 1997
ISSN: 0347-0520,1467-9442
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00072