منابع مشابه
Rights, Free Exchange, and Widespread Externalities
Sen’s libertarian paradox is ascribed to the inevitable conflict between the Pareto criterion and individuals’ rights to create negative externalities. Finite coalitions can effect exchanges of rights through Coaseian bargains in order to resolve inefficiencies due to local externalities. With a continuum of agents, however, finite coalitions are powerless to affect widespread externalities, ex...
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We study the optimal pricing strategies of a monopolist selling a divisible good (service) to consumers that are embedded in a social network. A key feature of our model is that consumers experience a (positive) local network effect. In particular, each consumer’s usage level depends directly on the usage of her neighbors in the social network structure. Thus, the monopolist’s optimal pricing s...
متن کاملSocial Networks and Externalities from Gift Exchange: Evidence from A Field Experiment.
This paper asks whether gift exchange generates externalities for people outside of the bilateral relationship between the gift giver and recipient, and whether the nature of this relationship is affected by social networks. We examine this question in the context of a field experiment in urban Chinese hospital outpatient clinics. We first show that when patients give a small gift, doctors reci...
متن کاملPricing in Social Networks with Negative Externalities
We study the problems of pricing an indivisible product to consumers who are embedded in a given social network. The goal is to maximize the revenue of the seller. We assume impatient consumers who buy the product as soon as the seller posts a price not greater than their values of the product. The product’s value for a consumer is determined by two factors: a fixed consumer-specified intrinsic...
متن کاملCore-stable networks with widespread externalities
We introduce a core-based stability concept for networks with widespread externalities. The model is a generalisation of the recursive core for partition function form games. We present a simple example of a favour network and show that the core is nonempty when players must pay transfers to intermediaries. This simple setting also models economic situations such as airline networks. Subject cl...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Rationality and Society
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1043-4631,1461-7358
DOI: 10.1177/1043463109335612