منابع مشابه
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In the presence of externalities across coalitions, Dutta et al. (2010) characterize their value by extending Hart and Mas-Colell reduced game consistency. In the present paper, we provide a characterization result for the core for games with externalities by extending one form of consistency studied by Moulin (1985), which is often refereed to as the complement-reduced game property. Moreover,...
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Two-sided matchings are an important theoretical tool used to model markets and social interactions. In many real life problems the utility of an agent is influenced not only by their own choices, but also by the choices that other agents make. Such an influence is called an externality. Whereas fully expressive representations of externalities in matchings require exponential space, in this pa...
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Many models of timing with irreversible decisions involve informational issues. In patent races, the level of scientific knowledge within a firm evolves randomly, and is unknown to its competitors until a patent has been filed. Nevertheless, competitors can infer some information on this level by observing whether the other firm is still pursuing the new venue. As another illustration, entry/ex...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Economic Review
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0020-6598,1468-2354
DOI: 10.1111/iere.12467