منابع مشابه
Extending Tournament Solutions
An important subclass of social choice functions, so-called majoritarian (or C1) functions, only take into account the pairwise majority relation between alternatives. In the absence of majority ties—e.g., when there is an odd number of agents with linear preferences—the majority relation is antisymmetric and complete and can thus conveniently be represented by a tournament. Tournaments have a ...
متن کامل3 Tournament Solutions
Perhaps one of the most natural ways to aggregate binary preferences from individual agents to a group of agents is simple majority rule, which prescribes that one alternative is socially preferred to another whenever a majority of agents prefers the former to the latter. Majority rule intuitively appeals to democratic principles, is easy to understand and—most importantly—satisfies some attrac...
متن کاملQuery Complexity of Tournament Solutions
A directed graph where there is exactly one edge between every pair of vertices is called a tournament. Finding the “best” set of vertices of a tournament is a well studied problem in social choice theory. A tournament solution takes a tournament as input and outputs a subset of vertices of the input tournament. However, in many applications, for example, choosing the best set of drugs from a g...
متن کاملPseudo-rationalizability and Tournament Solutions
The theory of choice has given us a full understanding of how rationality, formulated as the maximization of a fixed binary relation, is reflected in regularities exhibited by choices from a variable feasible set. In the literature on tournaments, solutions are often constructed to pick the maximal elements of a binary relation, but one that can vary with the feasible set. Thus, we would not ex...
متن کاملOn the Discriminative Power of Tournament Solutions
Tournament solutions constitute an important class of social choice functions that only depend on the pairwise majority comparisons between alternatives. Recent analytical results have shown that several concepts with appealing axiomatic properties such as the Banks set or the minimal covering set tend to not discriminate at all when the tournaments are chosen from the uniform distribution. Thi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-018-1112-x