Extending the Nash solution to choice problems with reference points
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Extending the Nash solution to choice problems with reference points
In 1985 Aumann axiomatized the Shapley NTU value by non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. We show that, when replacing unanimity by “unanimity for the grand coalition” and translation covariance, these axioms characterize the Nash solution on the the class of n-person choice problems with reference points. A ...
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A number of authors have enriched Nash’s original bargaining problem through the introduction of an additional point, which we call a salient point. When the salient point is restricted to lie in the bargaining set, it is interpreted as a reference point, the outcome, perhaps, of a bargain from an earlier period. When restricted to lie outside the bargaining set, it is interpreted as a claim on...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.04.001