Extending the extended consciousness debate: perception, imagination, and the common kind assumption

Abstract For some, the states and processes involved in realisation of phenomenal consciousness are not confined to within organismic boundaries experiencing subject. Instead, sub-personal basis perceptual experience can, does, extend beyond brain body implicate environmental elements through one’s interaction with world. These claims met by proponents predictive processing, who propose that perception imagination should be understood as a product same internal mechanisms. On this view, visually imagining is considered world-involving, it assumed world-involvement must essential for perception, thus internalism about true. However, argument from unity relies its strength on questionable conception relationship between two experiential states. I argue approach guilty harbouring an implicit commitment common kind assumption which does follow trivially their framework. That is, fundamental mental event. will there plausible alternative ways conceiving without drawing internalist metaphysical conclusions psychological theory. Thus, owes debate clarification further argumentation secure position.