Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Repeated First-Price Auctions
We study a model of two-round, rst-price, sealed bid auctions with two bidders and two identical items. We assume that both bidders want to purchase both items and the bidders valuation for the object remains the same in both rounds. After the conclusion of the rst round, the winner and the winning bid are publicly announced. The bidders use this information to update their beliefs about the...
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We have N = {1, . . . , n} bidders, where each bidder has a private valuation vi drawn from distribution Fi 1 with strictly positive den1 Here, we assume that valuations follow the IPV model. sity, fi : Ti → R>0, for a good up for sale by the auctioneer, agent 0. In a first-price, sealed-bid auction, each agent has a type vi ∈ Ti, and submits a bid bi to the auctioneer, without revealing what t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematics of Operations Research
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0364-765X,1526-5471
DOI: 10.1287/moor.2017.0920