منابع مشابه
Multi-Unit Auctions
We survey experimental research on multi-unit auctions with an emphasis on topics that may be of a unifying interest to experimental, as well as theoretical and empirical economists. Topics include static and dynamic multi-unit auctions; combinatorial auctions and efficient auction design; simultaneous and sequential auctions; bidder asymmetry and endogenous entry, and collusion in auctions. We...
متن کاملsolution of security constrained unit commitment problem by a new multi-objective optimization method
چکیده-پخش بار بهینه به عنوان یکی از ابزار زیر بنایی برای تحلیل سیستم های قدرت پیچیده ،برای مدت طولانی مورد بررسی قرار گرفته است.پخش بار بهینه توابع هدف یک سیستم قدرت از جمله تابع هزینه سوخت ،آلودگی ،تلفات را بهینه می کند،و هم زمان قیود سیستم قدرت را نیز برآورده می کند.در کلی ترین حالتopf یک مساله بهینه سازی غیر خطی ،غیر محدب،مقیاس بزرگ،و ایستا می باشد که می تواند شامل متغیرهای کنترلی پیوسته و گ...
Isotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions
The main result is that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in isotone pure strategies exists in a class of multi-unit auctions that includes the uniform-price, discriminatory, and Vickrey auctions, given riskneutrality and independent atomless types. We begin by considering all games of incomplete information in which types are atomless, each player’s action set is a finite lattice, and payoff is quas...
متن کاملIncentive Compatibility in Multi-unit Auctions
We characterize incentive compatibility in multi-unit auctions with multi-dimensional types. An allocation mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if it is nondecreasing in marginal utilities (NDMU). The notion of incentive compatibility we adopt is dominant strategy in private value models and ex post incentive compatibility in models with interdependent values. NDMU is the following req...
متن کاملCombination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions∗
This paper considers the problem of identification and estimation in the first-price multi-unit auction. It is motivated by the auctions of bus routes held in London where, because of anticipated synergies, bidders are allowed to submit bids on combinations of routes as well as on individual routes. We show that equilibrium combination bidding does not require cost synergies and can instead ser...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Industrial Organization
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0167-7187
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.02.005