Exploring pricing rules in combinatorial sealed-bid auctions

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چکیده

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

سال: 2012

ISSN: 0167-2681

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.02.018