Explicit vs tacit collusion: The effects of firm numbers and asymmetries
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Tacit collusion , firm asymmetries and numbers : evidence from EC merger cases ∗
This paper estimates the implicit model, especially the roles of size asymmetries and firm numbers, used by the European Commission to identify mergers with coordinated effects. This subset of cases offers an opportunity to shed empirical light on the conditions where a Competition Authority believes tacit collusion is most likely to arise. We find that, for the Commission, tacit collusion is a...
متن کاملCompetition Policy, Collusion, and Tacit Collusion
In this paper, I pursue three goals. The first is to model collusion in a way that is distinct from noncooperative collusion. The second and third are to develop a particular specification of a standard model of noncooperative collusion that permits explicit solution for equilibrium outputs and reversion thresholds and to extend this analysis to allow for a deterrence-based competition policy t...
متن کاملPure Numbers Effects, Market Power, and Tacit Collusion in Posted Offer Markets
This paper studies the effects of seller concentration and static market power on tacit collusion in extensively repeated laboratory posted-offer markets. Contrary to the implications of some earlier research, we find that tacit collusion does not become pervasive with extensive repetition. In a ‘strong no power’ design persistently competitive outcomes are observed in markets with three or fou...
متن کاملthe effect of explicit teaching of metacognitive vocabulary learning strategies on recall and retention of idioms
چکیده ندارد.
15 صفحه اولTacit Collusion in Oligopoly∗
We examine the economics literature on tacit collusion in oligopoly markets and take steps toward clarifying the relation between economists’ analysis of tacit collusion and those in the legal literature. We provide an example to motivate the idea that collusive profits can be achieved via tacit coordination in an environment where there is a unique, salient way for colluders to maximize and di...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Industrial Organization
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0167-7187
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.10.006