Explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma game under incomplete and complete information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
A common observation in experiments involving finite repetition of the prisoners’ dilemma is that players do not always play the single-period dominant strategies (“finking”), but instead achieve some measure of cooperation. Yet finking at each stage is the only Nash equilibrium in the finitely repeated game. We show here how incomplete information about one or both players’ options, motivation...
متن کاملRational Cooperation in a Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
The Emergence and Evolution of Social Norms: Rational Cooperation in a Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
متن کاملCooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Abstract: More than half a century after the first experiment on the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, evidence on whether cooperation decreases with experience–as suggested by backward induction–remains inconclusive. This paper provides a metaanalysis of prior experimental research and reports the results of a new experiment to elucidate how cooperation varies with the environment in this ...
متن کاملCooperation and Local Interactions in the Prisoners ’ Dilemma Game
* I want to thank Hans Haller and Mark Stegeman for their valuable suggestions and support. The paper benefited from the comments of participants in the 1997 SITE Summer Workshop. Abstract We consider a population of players playing a Prisoners' Dilemma Game in a local interaction setting, using a formalism of automata networks. Sufficient conditions for existence of an equilibrium where cooper...
متن کاملSustaining Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma with Local Interaction
This paper studies the repeated prisoners dilemma in a local interaction setup. We construct a sequential equilibrium in pure strategies that sustains cooperation for sufficiently patient players. The notion of sequential equilibrium is extended to extensive form games with inÞnite time horizon. The strategy is embedded in an explicitly deÞned expectation system, which may also be viewed as a ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0022-250X,1545-5874
DOI: 10.1080/0022250x.2016.1226301