Experimental Tests of the Coase Theorem with Large Bargaining Groups
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Status Quo Bias in Bargaining: An Extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem with an Application to the Coase Theorem
for valuable discussions and suggestions, and especially Kim Border for pointing us to the right duality results necessary in the proof of part B of our proposition. Abstract We use a generalized version of the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem to study ineeciencies in bilateral bargaining over trade of an indivisible good, where there is two sided private information on the valuations. We show tha...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Legal Studies
سال: 1986
ISSN: 0047-2530,1537-5366
DOI: 10.1086/467807