Experimental Evidence on the Impact of Payments and Property Rights on Forest User Decisions

Clearing forests for swidden agriculture, despite providing food to millions of farmers in the tropics, can be a major driver deforestation. Payments ecosystem services schemes help stop agriculture-induced forest loss by rewarding users maintaining forests. Clear and secure property rights are key prerequisite success these payment schemes. In this study, we use novel iterative dynamic game Madagascar Kenya examine farmer responses individual communal forestlands, with without financial incentives, context agricultural landscapes. We find that pro conservation behaviour, defined propensity keep or fallows on their lands, as well effects land tenure incentive treatments such differ across two contexts. The average percentages left forest/fallow 65 35% Madagascar, respectively. Individual ownership significantly improves decisions preserve leave fallow but has no significant effect Kenya. Also, treatment varies education wealth levels Madagascar. Subsidy increases farmers' willingness support interests both countries, its is four times greater interaction either country. conclude effectiveness incentives reform preserving forestland vary show how interactive games develop more targeted practical approach environmental policy.