Expectations as Reference Points: Field Evidence from Professional Soccer
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Expectations as Reference Points: Field Evidence from Professional Soccer
We show that professional soccer players and their coaches exhibit reference-dependent behavior during matches. Controlling for the state of the match and for unobserved heterogeneity, we show on a minute-by-minute basis that players breach the rules of the game, measured by the referee’s assignment of cards, significantly more often if their teams are behind the expected match outcome, measure...
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We show that professional soccer players exhibit reference-dependent behavior during matches. Controlling for the state of the match and for unobserved heterogeneity, we show on a minute-by-minute basis that a player breaches the rules of the game, measured by the referee’s assignment of cards, with a significantly higher probability if his team is behind the expected match outcome, measured by...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Management Science
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0025-1909,1526-5501
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2048