Exit, Voice, and Sabotage: Public Service Motivation and Guerrilla Bureaucracy in Times of Unprincipled Political Principals

Abstract Democratic backsliding has multiplied “unprincipled” political principals: governments with weak commitment to the public interest. Why do some bureaucrats engage in voice and guerrilla sabotage thwart policies against interest under “unprincipled principals,” yet others not? Despite its centrality contemporary governance, this conundrum not seen quantitative research. We address gap survey evidence from 1,700 Brazilian servants during Temer Presidency, widely perceived lack democratic legitimacy integrity. focus on one key explanator: service motivation (PSM). argue that greater PSM are more likely of policies,” exit avoid implementing policies.” Structural equation models support these hypotheses. Public service-motivated bureaucracies thus short-run stalwarts principals. Over time, they look depart, however, leaving principals a freer hand pursue