Existence of Pareto equilibria for constrained multiobjective games in H-space
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Existence of Pareto Equilibria for Multiobjective Games without Compactness
In this paper, we investigate the existence of Pareto and weak Pareto equilibria for multiobjective games without compactness. By employing an existence theorem of Pareto equilibria due to Yu and Yuan([10]), several existence theorems of Pareto and weak Pareto equilibria for the multiobjective games are established in a similar way to Flores-Bázan([4]).
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Computers & Mathematics with Applications
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0898-1221
DOI: 10.1016/s0898-1221(00)00092-4