Existence of minmax points in discontinuous strategic games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Stochastic Games: Existence of the Minmax
The existence of the value for stochastic games with finitely many states and actions, as well as for a class of stochastic games with infinitely many states and actions, is proved in [2]. Here we use essentially the same tools to derive the existence of the minmax and maxmin for n-player stochastic games with finitely many states and actions, as well as for a corresponding class of n-person st...
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An in nite game is approximated by restricting the players to nite subsets of their pure strategy spaces. A strategic approximation of an in nite game is a countable subset of pure strategies with the property that limits of all equilibria of all sequences of approximating games whose nite strategy sets eventually include each member of the countable set must be equilibria of the in nite game...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0022-247X
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmaa.2010.08.041