Existence and the Problem of Aḥwāl: The Quiddity and Ontological Status of Existence in Avicenna and His Islamic Reception

Abstract The Avicennian distinction between quiddity and existence opens the way to several derivative issues concerning of (what is) ontological status (whether how is). This paper presents a fine-grained account positions arguments developed by post-Avicennian authors on these matters, showing debates states ( aḥwāl ) grounding taʿlīl feed into picture. discussions revolve around features its knowability connection ground ʿilla ), or lack thereof. As for existence, standard idea clash realism (existence is an extramental existent) conceptualism purely mental calls further refinement. First, itself encompasses two distinct when it comes relation second-order (sameness, additionality). Second, tradition other doctrines not easily classifiable within realism-conceptualism framework (the existential non-assertability non-existence existence).