Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
the study of practical and theoretical foundation of credit risk and its coverage
پس از بررسی هر کدام از فاکتورهای نوع صنعت, نوع ضمانت نامه, نرخ بهره , نرخ تورم, ریسک اعتباری کشورها, کارمزد, ریکاوری, gdp, پوشش و وثیقه بر ریسک اعتباری صندوق ضمانت صادرات ایران مشخص گردید که همه فاکتورها به استثنای ریسک اعتباری کشورها و کارمزد بقیه فاکتورها رابطه معناداری با ریسک اعتباری دارند در ضمن نرخ بهره , نرخ تورم, ریکاوری, و نوع صنعت و ریسک کشورها اثر عکس روی ریسک اعتباری داردو پوشش, وثی...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 1999
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.163383