Executive Suite Independence: Is It Related to Board Independence?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Governance in the Executive Suite and Board Independence
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Management Science
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0025-1909,1526-5501
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2016.2603