منابع مشابه
Executive Stock Options: Portfolio Effects
Since executives typically receive new grants of stock options (ESOs) each year, longerserving executives often have portfolios of ESOs with differing strikes and maturities. Valuation models for stand-alone ESO grants have shown that trading restrictions, which force executives to bear unhedgeable risk until the options are exercised, induce earlier exercise and hence a lower cost to sharehold...
متن کاملPortfolio Policies with Stock Options
We study the partial equilibrium portfolio optimization problem for a myopic CRRA investor who can trade options on individual stocks. Applying the parametric portfolio approach of Brandt, Santa-Clara, and Valkanov (forthcoming) to derivatives we show that options characteristics (such as implied volatility and IV smile skew) convey information about the mispricing in the option portfolios. We ...
متن کاملValuation of Executive Stock Options
It has been common practice to provide executives of firms with executive stock options as a part of the compensation package; such options are available both in US and Australia. These executive stock options are call options with additional restrictions. Until recently, the executive stock options were not required to be disclosed in the financial reports of the firms. But this has changed du...
متن کاملindex derivatives, index futures, index options, stock portfolio futures, stock portfolio options
nowadays, the significant increase in the banks' non- performing loans is one of the main disturbances for authorities because of its bad effects on the macroeconomic index in our country such as increasing credit risk, liquidity risk and finally bankruptcy risk. social gap in welfare programs, deviation in monetary policies, etc. are the other bad results of this phenomenon. meanwhile, du...
متن کاملOverconfidence , Investment Policy , and Executive Stock Options ∗
Managers make decisions on behalf of shareholders. In this context, financial economists have promoted executive stock options as a means to realign the incentives of managers with those of shareholders. We argue that overconfidence and optimism, which are likely to characterize managers, provide an alternative solution to this agency problem. Whereas risk-averse rational managers tend to postp...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2022334