Executive compensation, bankruptcy risk, and managerial risk taking.
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Managerial Risk-Taking Behavior and Equity-Based Compensation
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Corporate Ownership and Control
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1810-3057,1727-9232
DOI: 10.22495/cocv11i2c6p3