Exclusivity and exclusion on platform Markets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economics
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0931-8658
DOI: 10.1007/s00712-016-0499-z