Exclusive Contracts and Market Dominance

Nonlinear Supply Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, and Equilibrium Market Foreclosure

We examine how the feasibility of both nonlinear pricing and exclusive dealing arrangements affect incentives for market foreclosure when two manufacturers contract with a retail monopolist. Surprisingly, we find that although market foreclosure equilibria exist, they are Pareto-dominated (from each manufacturer’s perspective) by all nonforeclosure equilibria. If one believes that Paretodominat...

Are Market-Share Contracts a Poor Man’s Exclusive Dealing?

Contracts that reference rivals have long been a focus of antitrust law and the subject of intense scholarly debate. This paper compares two such contracts, exclusive-dealing contracts and market-share contracts, in a model of naked exclusion. We discuss the different mechanisms through which each works and identify the fundamental tradeoff that arises: marketshare contracts are better at maxim...

Are Exclusive Contracts Anticompetitive?

While antitrust law is often hostile to exclusive contracts that say ”you agree not to purchase this product from anyone besides me”, economic theory so far has provided only partial support for such a hostility.1 This paper shows that this hostility can be justified under more general circumstances than has been established so far in the literature: a firm may introduce exclusivity clauses in ...

Exclusive contracts in health insurance

Competition between insurance companies for employees of a firm often increases the prices and reduces the availability of high-quality health plans offered to employees. An insurance company can reduce competition by signing an exclusive contract, which guarantees that the company is the only insurance provider. The study assesses whether exclusive contracts can alleviate the negative conseque...

Exclusive Contracts Between Hospitals and Physicians by