Exclusive contracts and demand foreclosure
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
N ° 2007 - 07 Exclusive contracts and demand foreclosure
A Þrm may decide to have some of its customers sign exclusive contracts in order to deprive a rival of the minimum viable size, exclude it from the market, and enjoy increased market power. If contracts are required to be simple enough, this strategy may induce inefficient exclusion even if the excluded Þrm is present at the contracting stage. Exclusive contracts may thus cause inefficient evic...
متن کاملNonlinear Supply Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, and Equilibrium Market Foreclosure
We examine how the feasibility of both nonlinear pricing and exclusive dealing arrangements affect incentives for market foreclosure when two manufacturers contract with a retail monopolist. Surprisingly, we find that although market foreclosure equilibria exist, they are Pareto-dominated (from each manufacturer’s perspective) by all nonforeclosure equilibria. If one believes that Paretodominat...
متن کاملOption Contracts and Vertical Foreclosure
A model of vertical integration is studied. Upstream firms sell differentiated inputs; downstream firms bundle them to make final products. Downstream products are sold as option contracts, which allow consumers to choose from a set of commodities at predetermined prices. The model is illustrated by examples in telecommunication and health markets. Equilibria of the integration game must result...
متن کاملDiagnosing Foreclosure due to Exclusive Dealing
Exclusive dealing arrangements, in which a distributor contracts to work exclusively with a single manufacturer, can be efficiency enhancing or they can be an anticompetitive means to foreclose markets. This paper evaluates the effect of exclusive distribution arrangements on competition in the Chicago beer market in 1994. A diagnostic test is provided to judge whether exclusive arrangements be...
متن کاملAre Exclusive Contracts Anticompetitive?
While antitrust law is often hostile to exclusive contracts that say ”you agree not to purchase this product from anyone besides me”, economic theory so far has provided only partial support for such a hostility.1 This paper shows that this hostility can be justified under more general circumstances than has been established so far in the literature: a firm may introduce exclusivity clauses in ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The RAND Journal of Economics
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0741-6261
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2011.00147.x