Exclusionary practices in two-sided markets: The effect of radius clauses on competition between shopping centers
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Note on ‘Competition in Two-sided Markets’
We extend the models in “Competition in two-sided markets” of Armstrong (2006, Rand Journal of Economics) by adding within-group externalities. In the monopoly and duopoly cases, positive within-group externalities reduce the price of the own group. Negative externalities have an opposite price effect. In the case of a competitive bottleneck, we show by examples that within a certain range of p...
متن کاملCompetition in two-sided markets
Many markets involve two groups of agents who interact via “platforms,” where one group’s benefit from joining a platform depends on the size of the other group that joins the platform. I present three models of such markets: a monopoly platform; a model of competing platforms where agents join a single platform; and a model of “competitive bottlenecks” where one group joins all platforms. The ...
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در این پایان نامه تاثیر دو نوع تست جزیی نگر و کلی نگر بر به یادسپاری محتوا ارزیابی شده که نتایج نشان دهندهکارایی تستهای کلی نگر بیشتر از سایر آزمونها است
15 صفحه اولSpatial competition between shopping centers ¬リニ
We study competition between two shopping centers that sell the same set of goods and are located at the extremes of a linear city, without restricting consumers tomake all their purchases at a single place. In the case of competition between a shoppingmall (set of independent single-product shops) and a department store (singlemultiproduct shop), we find that: if the number of goods is low, al...
متن کاملImperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
Article history: Received 20 June 2011 Available online 28 November 2013 JEL classification: C78 D43 L13
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Managerial and Decision Economics
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0143-6570
DOI: 10.1002/mde.2928