Excessive continuation and dynamic agency costs of debt

Debt Structure, Agency Costs and Firm’s Size: An Empirical Investigation

This paper shows that corporate debt type, maturity and priority structures and their determinants are not homogeneous across firms of different size. Small firms use leasing and bank loans and overdraft while large companies rely on loan capital, convertible and subordinated loans. Small companies depend more on secured debt while large companies’ debt is unsecured and subordinated. The result...

Impact of Long-term Debt on Overinvestment Problem of Agency

Business units are always faced with investment opportunities and need to make logical decisions on an optimal investment. Indeed, the investment of each business unit should be done with regard to the resource constraints and its effectiveness through the criteria for evaluating the projects including the net present value (NPV). The paper aims to investigate the effect of long-term debt on th...

Agency Costs in Dynamic Economic Models

We consider an overlapping generations economy where capital is produced from bank loans under stochastic constant returns to scale, and subject to idiosyncratic shocks whose realisations are costly to verify. Our formulation differs from earlier work in permitting investment projects to be in®nitely divisible and private agency costs to be convex. If there are external economies to ®nancial in...

Hedge Commitments and Agency Costs of Debt: Evidence from Interest Rate Protection Covenants and Accounting Conservatism

Investment Reversibility and Agency Cost of Debt

Previous research has argued that debt financing affects equityholders’ investment decisions, producing substantial inefficiency. This paper shows that the size of this inefficiency depends on the degree of investment reversibility. In a dynamic model of financing and investment, the paper provides an upper bound for the inefficiency produced by debt financing. The upper bound is decreasing in ...