Excess payoff dynamics in games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present the family of Excess Payoff Dynamics for normal-form games, where growth a strategy depends only on its current proportion and excess payoff, i.e., payoff advantage over average population payoff. Requiring dependence own natural sign-preserving condition, class essentially reduces to aggregate monotonic dynamics, functional generalization Replicator Dynamics. However, also include different subclass which contains Dynamics, Brown-von Neumann-Nash other interesting examples as, e.g., satisficing dynamics. clarify relation demand dynamics from microeconomics.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1095-7235', '0022-0531']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105464