Ex Post (In)Efficient Negotiation and Breakdown of Trade
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Ex Post (In) Efficient Negotiation and Breakdown of Trade
Using a novel audit methodology, we show that reputation concerns and norms against price gouging can lead to breakdown in ex post efficient trade. Sellers in a market in India do not use their increased bargaining power to charge higher prices when customers have a shock, but, rather, forgo the order. However, when customers offer a higher price, sellers are significantly more likely to accept...
متن کاملRational Inefficient Compromises in Negotiation
Korhonen, Phillips, Teich and Wallenius (1998), in their letter to the Editor, observe with some dismay that people are often not willing to improve the compromises they have achieved through negotiations and provide some possible explanations and remedies. In this note we attempt to address several of the concerns raised in the letter and point the reader to relevant literature. Acceptance of ...
متن کاملInefficient trade patterns: Excessive trade, cross-hauling and dumping
I study an example of a competitive environment in which trade occurs in a sequential manner. In this example, a country with a stable demand may suffer from trade with a country with unstable demand, there may be too much trade, a country may import and export the same good in the same period (cross-hauling) and dumping may occur. The timing of delivery is important. When delivery occurs befor...
متن کاملEx-Post Constrained-Efficient Bilateral Trade with Risk-Averse Traders
We address robust mechanism design for bilateral trade of an indivisible commodity, under incomplete information on traders’ private reservation values. Under ex-post individual rationality and ex-post incentive compatibility, we define the notion of ex-post constrained-efficiency. It is weaker than interim constrained efficiency, and it is a notion of constrained optimality that is independent...
متن کاملEx - ante and ex - post strong correlated
A strong correlated equilibrium is a strategy pro le that is immune to joint deviations. Di erent notions of strong correlated equilibria were de ned in the literature. One major di erence among those de nitions is the stage in which coalitions can plan a joint deviation: before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the deviating players receive their part of the correlated pro le. In this paper we prov...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2023626