Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly

Ex-Post Full Surplus Extraction, Straightforwardly

Consider an estimate of the common value of an auctioned asset that is symmetric in the bidders’types. Such an estimate can be represented solely in terms of the order statistics of those types. This representation forms the basis for a pricing rule yielding truthful bidding as an equilibrium, whether bidders’types are a¢ liated or independent. We highlight the link between the estimator and fu...

Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction

Information acquisition and full surplus extraction

It is well-known that when agents’ types are correlated, the mechanism designer can extract the entire surplus. This creates an incentive for agents to acquire information about other agents’ types. Robust lotteries (are payment schemes that) support full extraction and partially robust lotteries support efficient implementation in the presence of information acquisition opportunities. Necessar...

The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions

I consider a situation in which a principal commits to a mechanism first and then agents choose unobservable actions before they draw their types. The agents’ actions affect not only their payoffs directly but also a distribution of private types as well. Thus, the distribution of types is determined endogenously rather than exogeneously unlike standard mechanism design literature. Then I exten...

Aggregating Correlated Wind Power with Full Surplus Extraction

We study the problem of designing profitmaximizing mechanisms for an aggregator who aggregates wind power from a group of wind power producers (WPPs). The WPPs have more refined forecasts of the wind power generation than the aggregator. Such forecasts are their private information, which also give the reservation utilities of the WPPs. The goal of the aggregator is to elicit the private inform...