Ex-post core, fine core and rational expectations equilibrium allocations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Rational expectations equilibria and the ex-post core of an economy with asymmetric information
We study the relationship between the set of rational expectations equilibrium allocations and the ex-post core of exchange economies with asymmetric information. © 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
متن کاملSharing the cost of a network: core and core allocations
This paper discusses the core of the game corresponding to the standard fixed tree problem. We introduce the concept of a weighted constrained egalitarian solution. The core of the standard fixed tree game equals the set of all weighted constrained egalitarian solutions. The notion of home-down allocation is developed to create further insight in the local behavior of the weighted constrained e...
متن کاملLearning Within Rational-Expectations Equilibrium
Models of macroeconomic learning are populated by agents who possess a great deal of knowledge of the “true” structure of the economy, and yet ignore the impact of their own learning on that structure; they may learn about an equilibrium, but they do not learn within it. An alternative learning model is presented where agents’ decisions are informed by hypotheses they hold regarding the economy...
متن کاملBayesian Implementable Efficient and Core Allocations
I examine the implementation of core allocations when agents are differently informed. A one state deviation principle (an allocation cannot be improved at any state) and measurability restrictions (blocking allocations may only be measurable with respect to each agent’s private information) are sufficient to yield interim core solutions that are Bayesian implementable. Private measurability of...
متن کاملContinuous and Feasible Implementation of Rational-Expectations Lindahl Allocations
In this paper we consider Bayesian implementation of rational-expectations Lindahl allocations for economic environments with public goods when agents are incompletely informed about environments. We construct a continuous and feasible mechanism whose Bayesian equilibrium allocations coincide with rational-expectations Lindahl allocations. We not only allow the types of individuals to be unknow...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Economics
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0304-4068
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.12.001