Ex-ante dynamic network tariffs for transmission cost recovery
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Applied Energy
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0306-2619
DOI: 10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.113979