Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games *
We examine dynamic models of evolutionary selection processes on asymmetric two-player games. Conditions are established under which dynamic selection processes will yield outcomes that respect iterated strict dominance. The addition of a stability requirement ensures that outcomes will be Nash equilibria. However, we find that stable outcomes need not respect weak dominance, and hence need not...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 1993
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1006/game.1993.1031