Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games coevolving on adaptive networks
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games coevolving on adaptive networks
We study a model for switching strategies in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game on adaptive networks of player pairings that coevolve as players attempt to maximize their return. We use a node-based strategy model wherein each player follows one strategy at a time (cooperate or defect) across all of its neighbors, changing that strategy and possibly changing partners in response to local changes in th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Complex Networks
سال: 2017
ISSN: 2051-1310,2051-1329
DOI: 10.1093/comnet/cnx018