Evolutionary Markovian strategies in spatial games

Evolutionary Markovian Strategies in 2 × 2 Spatial Games

Evolutionary spatial 2 × 2 games between heterogeneous agents are analyzed using different variants of cellular automata (CA). Agents play repeatedly against their nearest neighbors 2 × 2 games specified by a rescaled payoff matrix with two param-eteres. Each agent is governed by a binary Markovian strategy (BMS) specified by 4 conditional probabilities [p R , p S , p T , p P ] that take values...

Fitness-Associated Recombination Strategies in Evolutionary Games

Counting Stable Strategies in Random Evolutionary Games

In this paper we study the notion of the Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) in evolutionary games and we demonstrate their qualitative difference from the Nash Equilibria, by showing that a random evolutionary game has on average exponentially less number of ESS than the number of Nash Equilibria in the underlying symmetric 2-person game with random payoffs.

Non-local interactions in spatial evolutionary games

As a special case of symmetric game in which the players share a common payoff matrix, evolutionary game provides a suitable approach to model and explore the emergence of cooperative behavior in natural and social systems. The evolutionary spatial game (ESG) further specifies the payoff for each individual by both the payoff matrix M and the spatial dependence structure of the population on a ...

Opportunistic migration in spatial evolutionary games.

We study evolutionary games in a spatial diluted grid environment in which agents strategically interact locally but can also opportunistically move to other positions within a given migration radius. Using the imitation of the best rule for strategy revision, it is shown that cooperation may evolve and be stable in the Prisoner's Dilemma game space for several migration distances but only for ...