Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games
We study equilibrium selection by evolutionary learning in monotone two-type signalling games. The learning process we study extends that introduced by Young (1993, Econometrica 61, 57–84) to deal with incomplete information and sequential moves; it thus involves stochastic trembles. For vanishing trembles the process gives rise to strong selection among sequential equilibria: if the game has s...
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Lewis-Skyrms signaling games (Lewis 1969; Skyrms 2010) have been studied under a variety of low-rationality learning dynamics (Barrett 2006; Barrett and Zollman 2009; Huttegger, Skyrms, Smead, and Zollman 2010; Huttegger, Skyrms, Tarrès, and Wagner 2014; Huttegger, Skyrms, and Zollman 2014). Reinforcement dynamics are stable but slow and prone to evolving suboptimal signaling conventions. A low...
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Horn’s division of pragmatic labour (Horn, 1984) is a universal property of language, and amounts to the pairing of simple meanings to simple forms, and deviant meanings to complex forms. This division makes sense, but a community of language users that do not know it makes sense will still develop it after a while, because it gives optimal communication at minimal costs. This property of the d...
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We study an evolutionary model in which strategy revision protocols are based on agent specific characteristics rather than wider social characteristics. We assume that agents are primed to play a mixed strategy, with the weights on each pure strategy modifiable on the basis of experience. At any time, the distribution of mixed strategies over agents in a large population is described by a prob...
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Equilibrium outcomes in signalling games can be very sensitive to the specification of how receivers interpret and thus respond to deviations from the path of play. We develop a micro-foundation for these off-path beliefs, and an associated equilibrium refinement, in a model where equilibrium arises through non-equilibrium learning by populations of patient and long-lived senders and receivers....
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1006/game.2000.0795