Evolutionary Games with Sequential Decisions and Dollar Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Evolutionary games with sequential decisions and dollar auctions
Conflict occurs throughout the animal world. Such conflicts are often modelled by evolutionary games, where individual animals make a single decision each within the game. These decisions can be sequential, in either order, or simultaneous, and the outcome of the game can depend strongly upon which case is assumed to occur. Real conflicts are generally more complex, however. A fight over a terr...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Dynamic Games and Applications
سال: 2016
ISSN: 2153-0785,2153-0793
DOI: 10.1007/s13235-016-0212-4