Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: a colloquium
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: A colloquium
Networks form the backbone of many complex systems, ranging from the Internet to human societies. Accordingly, not only is the range of our interactions limited and thus best described and modeled by networks, it is also a fact that the networks that are an integral part of such models are often interdependent or even interconnected. Networks of networks or multilayer networks are therefore a m...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The European Physical Journal B
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1434-6028,1434-6036
DOI: 10.1140/epjb/e2015-60270-7