Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Populations with Heterogenous Structures
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Populations with Heterogenous Structures
Evolutionary graph theory is a well established framework for modelling the evolution of social behaviours in structured populations. An emerging consensus in this field is that graphs that exhibit heterogeneity in the number of connections between individuals are more conducive to the spread of cooperative behaviours. In this article we show that such a conclusion largely depends on the indivi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: PLoS Computational Biology
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1553-7358
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003567