Evolutionary Game Dynamics in a Finite Continental Island Population Model and Emergence of Cooperation
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider the continental island model for a finite haploid population with total number of $${\textit{n}}$$ demes consisting one continent and $$n-1$$ islands. assume viability differences in captured by linear game within each deme as result pairwise interactions. Assuming weak selection, conservative migration limit case structured coalescent assumptions, we derive first-order approximation fixation probability single mutant, initially introduced continent, respect to intensity selection. This is applied iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, when resident strategy always defect mutant cooperative tit-for-tat. In this context, investigate condition under which selection favors emergence cooperation an extension “one-third law” evolution. When islands are same size, compare its Wright’s counterpart. have but size differs from how asymmetry sizes can better promote evolution tit-for-tat compared equal
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Dynamic Games and Applications
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['2153-0793', '2153-0785']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00443-1