Evolutionary dynamics on measurable strategy spaces: Asymmetric games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Asymmetric Evolutionary Games
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are distinguished by only their strategies. In nature, however, the microscopic interactions between players are nearly always asymmetric due to environmental effects, d...
متن کاملEvolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games *
We examine dynamic models of evolutionary selection processes on asymmetric two-player games. Conditions are established under which dynamic selection processes will yield outcomes that respect iterated strict dominance. The addition of a stability requirement ensures that outcomes will be Nash equilibria. However, we find that stable outcomes need not respect weak dominance, and hence need not...
متن کاملGames on Cellular Spaces: An Evolutionary Approach
By using differential equations, evolutionary game theory shows that most of the games of competition for resources have equilibrium strategies named Evolutionary Stable. Although this approach can deduce these points, it is not possible to say how or whether a population will reach such equilibrium. We present an evolutionary agent-based model where individuals compete for space using mixed st...
متن کاملClassical vs Quantum Games: Continuous-time Evolutionary Strategy Dynamics
This paper unifies the concepts of evolutionary games and quantum strategies. First, we state the formulation and properties of classical evolutionary strategies, with focus on the destinations of evolution in 2-player 2strategy games. We then introduce a new formalism of quantum evolutionary dynamics, and give an example where an evolving quantum strategy gives reward if played against its cla...
متن کاملEvolutionary dynamics over continuous action spaces for population games that arise from symmetric two-player games
Any absolutely continuous, piecewise smooth, symmetric two-player game can be extended to define a population game in which each player interacts with a large representative subset of the entire population. Assuming that players respond to the payoff gradient over a continuous action space, we obtain nonlinear integro-partial differential equations that are numerically tractable and sometimes a...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Differential Equations
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0022-0396
DOI: 10.1016/j.jde.2015.07.005