Evolution of extortion in structured populations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Evolution of extortion in structured populations
Extortion strategies can dominate any opponent in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game. But if players are able to adopt the strategies performing better, extortion becomes widespread and evolutionary unstable. It may sometimes act as a catalyst for the evolution of cooperation, and it can also emerge in interactions between two populations, yet it is not the evolutionarily stable outcome. Here ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Physical Review E
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1539-3755,1550-2376
DOI: 10.1103/physreve.89.022804