Evolution of Cooperation in a Heterogeneous Graph: Fixation Probabilities under Weak Selection

Evolution of Cooperation in a Heterogeneous Graph: Fixation Probabilities under Weak Selection

It has been shown that natural selection favors cooperation in a homogenous graph if the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds the degree of the graph. However, most graphs related to interactions in real populations are heterogeneous, in which some individuals have many more neighbors than others. In this paper, we introduce a new state variable to measure the time evolution of cooperation in a hetero...

Supporting Information for “Evolution of cooperation in a heterogeneous graph: Fixation probabilities under neutral selection ”

Evolution of conditional cooperation under multilevel selection

We study the emergence of conditional cooperation in the presence of both intra-group and inter-group selection. Individuals play public goods games within their groups using conditional strategies, which are represented as piecewise linear response functions. Accordingly, groups engage in conflicts with a certain probability. In contrast to previous studies, we consider continuous contribution...

Fixation times in evolutionary games under weak selection

In evolutionary game dynamics, reproductive success increases with the performance in an evolutionary game. If strategy A performs better than strategy B, strategy A will spread in the population. Under stochastic dynamics, a single mutant will sooner or later take over the entire population or go extinct. We analyze the mean exit times (or average fixation times) associated with this process. ...

Fixation probabilities in populations under demographic fluctuations

We study the fixation probability of a mutant type when introduced into a resident population. As opposed to the usual assumption of constant population size, we allow for stochastically varying population sizes. This is implemented by a stochastic competitive Lotka-Volterra model. The competition coefficients are interpreted in terms of inverse payoffs emerging from an evolutionary game. Since...