Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game
In an environment of anonymous random matching, Kandori [1992] showed that with a sufficiently rich class of simple information systems the folk theorem holds. We specialize to a gift-giving game and examine the stochastic stability of a process of learning and evolution in this setting. If the benefit of future altruism is too small, then there is no altruism. When the benefit of altruism is l...
متن کاملNote: Using the Emergent Seed to Completely Characterize “evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game.”
Let β be the ratio of benefit to cost of an altruistic act controlling for trembles. In “Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game” [3] the stochastically stable strategy is found if β < 2 or β > 4. In this note the stochastically stable strategy is found for the intermediary range and the speed of evolution is bounded. It is shown that if β ≤ 3 then players are selfish in the long run, i...
متن کاملReputation and Distribution in a Gift Giving Game
The folk theorem allows a very unequal division between players. In nonrepeated experimental games with many equilibria, such as ultimatum, observed play involves a relatively equal division between players. In a two-player repeated game setting there is a simple intuition about this: a poor player has little to lose by deviating from his equilibrium strategy. So a rich player ought to be willi...
متن کاملGift Giving with Emotions
This paper presents a two-player, psychological game-theoretic model of gift giving where emotions matter. Beliefs enter directly into players’ payoff functions. Surprise, disappointment, embarrassment and pride arise from comparing players’ beliefs about the gift they will give or receive to the actual choice of gift. Depending on beliefs and the cost of the gift, a gift-giving, a non-gift-giv...
متن کاملRunning head : Gift Giving in Courtship Gift Giving as Costly Signaling in Courtship Contexts
Social scientists from a variety of fields have grappled with questions about why gift giving exists and where its utility comes from because it is economically inefficient. Economic models of sexual relationships (e.g., Baumeister & Vohs, 2004) propose that gifts given by men are motivated by attempts to barter for access to sex. We offer an alternative model, based on costly signaling theory ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2823