Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite
According to one view about the rationality of belief, such rationality is ultimately nothing other than the rationality that one exhibits in taking the means to one’s ends. On this view, epistemic rationality is really a species or special case of instrumental rationality. In particular, epistemic rationality is instrumental rationality in the service of one’s distinctively cognitive or episte...
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To many it seems obvious that normativity or justification depends upon desire. Few answers to the question, ‘Why should I?’ seem more natural than ‘Because I want to,’ and if we are told, ‘You should do this,’ there is something natural about the objection, ‘But I don’t want to, so why?’ I believe that the very nature of normativity can be comprehensively explained in terms of desire: the myst...
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Lindquist, Siegel, Quigley, and Barrett (2013) critiqued our recent meta-analysis that reported the effects of discrete emotions on outcomes, including cognition, judgment, physiology, behavior, and experience (Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011). Lindquist et al. offered 2 major criticisms—we address both and consider the nature of emotion and scientific debate. Their 1st criticism, that the meta-an...
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A number of points put forth by Hartmann and Michelsen (2002) (henceforth HM) are, in fact, irrelevant to the iris effect (i.e., their discussion of the meteorological origin of various systems). We shall discuss this in greater detail later. Some are quantitatively insignificant (the effect of spreading cloud cover near the equator); we shall also return to this later. Others are simply wrong ...
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I evaluate two new objections to an infinitist account of epistemic justification, and conclude that they fail to raise any new problems for infinitism. The new objections are a refined version of the finite-mind objection, which says infinitism demands more than finite minds can muster, and the normativity objection, which says infinitism entails that we are epistemically blameless in holding ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0031-8205,1933-1592
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00085.x