Eviction threats and investment incentives
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Eviction threats and investment incentives
We show that the effect of eviction threats on unobservable investment effort can be positive. We demonstrate this apparently counter-intuitive result in a model of tenancy where investment by a tenant in the current period raises the chances of doing well in the next period, and therefore retaining the job in the period after next period. If the tenant earns rents, the landlord can partly subs...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Development Economics
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0304-3878
DOI: 10.1016/s0304-3878(04)00024-0