EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK FOOTPRINTS ON INFLATION FORECAST UNCERTAINTY
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Impact of Central Bank Transparency on Inflation Volatility
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Inquiry
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0095-2583
DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12469