Ethics of Strategic Voting in Popular Elections

نویسندگان

چکیده

Misreporting of preferences is a common behavior among voters but still considered as moral wrongdoing. I propose the conceptual framework its dilemmas and argue that tactical voting may NOT be regarded wrong if implemented in popular election. examine relationship between strategic burden correspondence to particular doubts possible found respective literature. Thanks paradoxes revealed by mathematicians economists gathered around movement called social choice theory challenge 1) “the consequentialistic argument” 2) “express value which eventually non-conclusive whereas it presupposes not commonly accepted view on role election democracy itself. In answer 3) “sincere suggests manipulation since agent does express one's profound preference, so say, vote naively, distinguish sincere insincere manipulations. Then, five Sattherwaite's “transparency arguments”: 4) inequality skills, 5) inefficiency, 6) non-transparency voters' preferences, 7) representatives' 8) randomness, treat large valid with minor comments added. However, believe some arguments” can adopted virtue rather than vice democracy, because encourage cooperation induce actualize ongoing coalitions. Finally, weak strong position against treating Former one argues “sincere”, therefore morally acceptable according argument 3). latter rejects election’s claim bear any persuades itself should perceived an ethics-free decision-making device.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Spo?ecznej

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['2082-3304']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2022.3.60