Estimating subjective probabilities

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Unanimous subjective probabilities

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty

سال: 2014

ISSN: 0895-5646,1573-0476

DOI: 10.1007/s11166-014-9194-z