ESG Mutual Fund Voting on Executive Compensation Shareholder Proposals
نویسندگان
چکیده
ABSTRACT We investigate how mutual funds with environmental, social, and governance (ESG) objectives vote on shareholder proposals related to executive compensation. Using a sample of 94,695 votes by 2,354 from 2012 2021, we find ESG are 9.4 percent more likely than non-ESG in favor such proposals, the likelihood increases 19.2 for aligning compensation environmental social (ES) objectives. also 14.9 support improve transparency, but only 7.0 about redesigning Our results consistent perceiving greater net benefits supporting particularly those ES transparency. Additionally, committed regulatory filings fund families that voluntarily signed United Nations’ Principles Responsible Investment. JEL Classifications: G23; G30; M12; M14.
منابع مشابه
Do Mutual Fund Managers Monitor Executive Compensation?
We find significant relations between active mutual fund portfolio holdings and executive compensation, which appear to be largely driven by mutual fund investment styles rather than monitoring behaviour. Aggressive growth fund holdings are associated with performance pay, while income fund holdings are negatively related. We also find that mutual fund holdings are insensitive to changes in exe...
متن کاملNonbinding Voting for Shareholder Proposals
Shareholder proposals are a common form of shareholder activism. Voting for shareholder proposals, however, is nonbinding since management has the authority to reject the proposal even if it received majority support from shareholders. We analyze whether nonbinding voting is an effective mechanism for conveying shareholder expectations. We show that, unlike binding voting, nonbinding voting gen...
متن کاملThe evolution of shareholder voting for executive compensation schemes
We examine shareholder voting on management-sponsored compensation proposals from 1992 through 2003 to determine how voting has evolved as a result of changes in the corporate governance environment. We investigate three questions: have regulatory changes and changes in investor sentiment affected voting; do the same factors appear to influence voting over time and has the impact of the various...
متن کاملInternet Appendix for "Nonbinding Voting for Shareholder Proposals"
Proof of Lemma A.1: The shareholders bene t from voting for the proposal depends on his beliefs about the state of the world. Since !g > !b, other shareholders votes are informative about their signals and could be used to update the shareholders beliefs. However, when voting, the shareholder does not observe the votes of other shareholders and therefore has to consider N possible situations...
متن کاملHeterogeneity and peer effects in mutual fund proxy voting
This paper studies voting in corporate director elections. We construct a comprehensive data set of 2,058,788 mutual fund votes over a two-year period. We find systematic heterogeneity in voting: some funds are consistently more management-friendly than others. We also establish the presence of peer effects: a fund is more likely to oppose management when other funds are more likely to oppose i...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Management Accounting Research
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['1558-8033', '1049-2127']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-2022-036